An empirical test of the relationship between the interest rate and other commercial lending variables : by Van Auken, Howard Evans,
in f o r m a t io n  t o  u s e r s
Tliis was produced from a copy of a document sent to us for microfilming. While the 
most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document 
have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality o f the material 
submitted.
The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand 
markings or notations which may appear on this reproduction.
1. The sign or “ target’  ^ for pages apparently lacking from the document 
photographed is “Missing Page(s)” . If it was possible to obtain the missing 
page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. 
This may have necessitated cutting through an image and duplicating 
adjacent pages to assure you of complete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a round black mark it is an 
indication that the film inspector noticed either blurred copy because of 
movement during exposure, or duplicate copy. Unless we meant to delete 
copyrighted materials that should not have been filmed, you will find a 
good image of the page in the adjacent frame.
3. When a m tp, drawing or chart, etc., is part of the material being photo­
graphed the photographer has followed a definite method in “sectioning” 
the material. It is customary to begin filming at the upper left hand com er 
of a large sheet and to continue from left to right in equal sections with 
small overlaps. If necessary, sectioning is continued again—beginning 
below the first row and continuing on until complete.
4. For any illustrations that cannot be reproduced satisfactorily by 
xerography, photographic prints can be purchased at additional cost and 
tipped into your xerographic copy. Requests can be made to our 
Dissertations Customer Services Department.
5. Some pages in any docum ent may have indistinct print. In all cases we 
have filmed the best available copy.
University
Microfilms
International
3 0 0  N, 2 E E B  R O A D ,  A N N  A R B O R ,  Ml 4 8 1 0 6  
18 B E D F O R D  ROW,  L O N D O N  W C I R  4 E J ,  E N G L A N D
8101525
VAN AUKEN, HOWARD EVANS
AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETIVEEN HIE INTEREST 
RATE AND OTHER COMMERCIAL LENDING VARIABLES: A
CONTINGENT CLMMS APPROACH
The University of Oklahoma PH.D. 1980
University 
Microfilms
I nternStiOnâ! 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48105
Copyright J380
by
VAN AUKEN, HOWARD EVANS
All Rights Reserved
PLEASE NOTE:
In a l l  cases t h i s  m ater ia l  has been fi lmed in the  bes t  poss ib le  
way from the a v a i la b le  copy,. Problems encountered with t h i s  
document have been i d e n t i f i e d  here with a check mark .
1. Glossy photographs
2. Colored i l l u s t r a t i o n s
3. Photographs with dark background 
'4. I l l u s t r a t i o n s  a re  poor c o p y ____
5. ° r i n t  shows through as the re  i s  t e x t  on both sides of  page 
5. I n d i s t i n c t ,  broken or  small p r i n t  on several pages
7. T igh t ly  bound copy with p r i n t  l o s t  in spine
8. Computer p r i n to u t  pages with i n d i s t i n c t  p r i n t
9. Page(s) _____  lacking when mater ia l  rece ived ,  and not  a v a i la b le
from school or  author
10. Page(s)  ______ seem to be missing in numbering only as t e x t
follows
n. Poor carbon c o p y ________
12. Not o r ig in a l  copy, several  pages with b lurred  type
13. Appendix pages a re  poor copy  _______
14. Original  copy with l i g h t  type _ _ _ _ _ _ _
15. Curling and wrinkled pages ________
16. Other
Universiw
M icrarim s
International
THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA 
GRADUATE COLLEGE
AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INTEREST 
RATE AND OTHER COMMERCIAL LENDING VARIABLES:
A CONTINGENT CLAIMS APPROACH
A DISSERTATION 
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
in
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
By
Howard Evans Van Auken 
Norman, Oklahoma 
1980
AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTEREST RATE 
AND OTHER COMMERCIAL LENDING VARIABLES 
A CONTINGENT CLAIMS APPROACH
APPROVED BY
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
page
LIST OF T A B L E S ................................................iv
LIST OF FIGURES............................................. v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS............................................. vi
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................  1
Summary of Dissertation.............................  3
Scope and Limitations...............................  5
II. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE......................  6
Analysis of Commercial Bank Lending Decisions. . . 6
Commercial Loans.................................  3
Secured Loans ..................   8
Unsecured Loans .................................  8
Loans Pricing........................................  9
Loan Pricing Policies ........................... 9
Empirical Evidence.................................. 11
Jacobs' Study.................................... 12
Hester Studies ...............................  14
Bank and Federal Reserve System
Survey of 1955 ........................  15
Federal Reserve System Survey
of 1972................. '................. 17
Survey of Terms of Bank Lending................ 18
Fixed Versus Floating Interest Rates. . . 19
Loan Commitments and Commitment Fees. . . 20
Collateral...................................... 21
Loan Size...................■..................... 24
Loan Profitability Model........................... 24
Problems with Conventional Models.....................26
Identifying Payment Pattern ....................  26
Identifying Relevant Cash Flows ...............  27
Cost of C a p i t a l .................................... 29
IX
III. CONTINGENT CLAIMS APPLICATIONS TO COMMERCIAL Page
BANK LOANS........................................... 33
Development of Contingent Claims Theory.............. 33
Merton's Option Price Restrictions................ 34
Black-Scholes Model ..............................  36
Model Development.  ....................... 37
Analysis of Variables........................... 39
Extensions of Black-Scholes Model..............40
Applications of Black-Scholes Model............41
Loan Agreements As Contingent Claims ............... 43
Call Option Analysis.  ............................. 43
Loan Analysis.......................... 44
Payoff Analysis ............................  45
Call and Put Options Combinations.............. 46
Fully Guaranteed Loans.......................46
Partially Guaranteed Loans.................. 47
Research. Hypothesis of Commercial Bank Loans' As
Contingent Claims ................................. 47
Interest R a t e ...................................... 47
Loan S i z e ........................................... 49
Loan R i s k ........................................... 51
Floating Interest Rates ..........................  52
Loan Commitments.................................... 54
Demand Loans.........................................55
Time to Maturity.................................... 58
IV. EMPIRICAL TESTS AND RESULTS........................... 62
Description of D a t a ................................ 62
Description of Results..............................63
Logarithm of Loan S i z e ......................... 67
Loan Risk......................................... 68
Floating Interest Rates......................... 69
Demand Status.................................... 70
Commitment Status................................71
Time to M a t u r i t y ................................ 72
V. CONCLUSIONS............................................. 74
APPENDIX I .................................................... 80
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...............................................  81
ACKNOIv/LEDGEMENTS............................................. 93
111
LIST OF TABLES
TABLE Page
1- Variables, Symbols, and Description of
Variables Used in Regression Analysis. 64
2. Results of Regression Analysis Using Interest
Rate as the Dependent V a r i a b l e .................  65
3. Correlation Matrix for Regression Using Interest
Rate as the Deoendent V a r i a b l e ................. 67
IV
LIST OF FIGURES 
FIGURE Page
1. Payoff Graph for L oan.................................  45
2. Pavoff Involving Put O c tion ..........................  4’6
V
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This study is part of a larger grant given to the 
Bank Research Studies at the Center for Economic and Man­
agement Research by the Small Business Administration.
The successful completion of the study would not have been 
possible without the advice and guidance from my committee 
chairman, Neil B. Murphy. His knowledge of banking and 
ability to integrate academic research with banking indus­
try needs has substantially broadened my academic exposure 
and research perspective. The effort by Robert A. Eisenbeis 
to obtain the required data analysis at the Federal Reserve 
Board is also appreciated.
I could not have completed this project without 
the moral support from my wife, Alice, and children, Rob, 
Chris, and Brigham. As a family we have shared my frus­
tration and now, as a family, we will share the rewards.
VI
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Commercial banks are financial intermediaries that 
acquire funds by creating claims on themselves in the form 
of deposits and subsequently provide funds to borrowers. 
Commercial banking has provided the link between depositors 
and borrowers that has fostered economic development and 
growth. Depositors benefit by being able to securely ac­
cumulate wealth and borrowers benefit by being able to ac­
quire investment capital.
Commercial banks fulfill the functions of (1) ena­
bling investors to acquire needed capital, (2) reducing the 
risk of accumulating wealth, and (3) providing liquid assets 
for depositors. Of these functions, creating credit through 
loans is the most important activity.^ The focus of all 
other commercial banking activity revolves around lending
^Oliver G. Woods, Commercial Banking: Practice and
Policy (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1978), p. 6.
funds and serving borrowers since the major source of com-
2
mercial bank income is lending.
The terms of lending - which include such factors 
as the interest rate, compensating balance, collateral, loan 
size, and maturity date - depend on the customer bank rela­
tionship. From the bank's perspective, the more favorable 
the relationship, the higher tne profitability of the cus­
tomer and the more favorable the borrower's terms of lending. 
When loans are extended, commercial banks are concerned with 
the financial stability of the business and, in effect, 
become a partner in the business since financial difficul­
ties for the business impact the bank. The relationship is 
symbiotic with the commercial bank providing a variety of 
services that enable borrowers to improve efficiency and 
profitability and the borrower providing the bank with a 
source of revenue.
Various models have been used to value lending deci­
sions, such as the net present value and marginal cost- 
marginal revenue models, but these models have been plagued 
with unrealistic assumptions and nebulous data requirements. 
The approach tested in this dissertation is a new approach
2
Donald R. Hodgman, Commercial Bank Loan and Invest­
ment Policy (Champaign: Bureau of Economic and Business
Research, University of Illinois, 1963), p. 97.
that circumvents some of the past problems in application.
The contingent claims approach views loan value as 
being dependent on the characteristics of the terms of lend­
ing, From the banks perspective, more favorable lending 
terms imply more valuable loans and more unfavorable lending 
terms imply less valuable loans. This new approach has the 
potential advantage of not requiring estimates of loan 
variables such as cash flows and cost of capital, but re­
lies on terms of lending that are directly observable.
This study is a test of the usefulness of this approach.
Summary of the Dissertation
To provide an orientation for the reader, each chap­
ter is reviewed at this point. Chapter II is a review of 
the relevant literature pertaining to the analysis of insti­
tutional lending. A description of the categories of loans 
is followed by a discussion of how the customer-bank rela­
tionship affects loan policies and lending decisions. Em­
pirical evidence supporting the relationship among lending 
terms provides a background for the development of specific 
hypotheses in Chapter IV. The review of the empirical 
studies include a Congressional committee report on financing 
small business, a research project by Jacobs, and articles 
by Hester and by Boltz and Campbell.
4The development of contingent claims theory is 
covered in Chapter III. With contingent claims, options 
were initially used as a hedge against risk in the 1800's 
followed by the quantitative development of models in the 
1900's. The Black-Scholes model is a widely accepted op­
tions valuation model that determines the equilibrium 
value of stock option. This model has subsequently been 
extended to allow a relaxation of assumptions and has been 
applied to value contingent claims other than options. Con­
tingent claims analysis is further extended to include 
analyzing lending decisions.
The research hypotheses developed in Chapter IV 
integrate previous empirical studies covered in Chapter II 
with contingent claims theory developed in Chapter III. 
Contingent claims relationships should be consistent with 
previously established relationships, but if inconsistencies 
exist the rationale should be evident from contingent claims 
theory.
To test the research hypotheses, data from the Fed­
eral Reserve's Survey of Terms of Lending is used in a 
linear regression to test the relationship between commit­
ment status, logarithm of loan size, maturity date, demand 
status, collateral, and floating interest rate and the effec­
tive interest rate using approximately 21,500 loan observa­
tions. The results of the regression analysis are presented.
The conclusions that can be drawn from the regres­
sion analysis are discussed in Chapter V. The results indi­
cate that commercial bank loans can, in general, be analyzed 
in a contingent claims framework. However, it also clearly 
shows that bank-customer relationships are more comprehensive 
than can be uncovered from the data in this study.
Scope and Limitations 
The purpose of this dissertation is to provide 
empirical tests of the contingent claims approach to loan 
analysis. Tests of hypotheses based on contingent claims 
theory relating to commercial loan interest rates to other 
specific loan characteristics are used to determine if lend­
ing terms are established as would be predicted with con­
tingent claims analysis. •
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE
The purpose of this chapter is to review the reLe-- 
vant Literature pertaining to institutional lending, the 
terms of lending, and the associated problems of analyzing 
loan applicants. After discussing loan analysis and pre­
vious research on the terms of lending, the problems asso­
ciated with traditional loan analysis are presented.
Analvsis of Commercial Bank Lending Decisions
Commercial banks, as financial institutions, serve 
the role of providing funds to private and public sectors 
to influence economic growth and development. While essen­
tially a service industry, the three major aspects of com­
mercial banking activity, providing for deposits, loans, 
and other services, are integrated into a bank-customer re­
lationship that both serves the customer's needs and maxi­
mizes the commercial bank's long run profit.
since the primary function of commercial banking is 
providing funds to customers as loans, all other banking 
activities are subordinated to the lending activity and 
serve the goals of the lending policy. The deposit and 
investment policies are designed to provide lendable funds 
when needed and other services offered to customers must be 
designed to attract depositors and borrowers.
Commercial banks are the major suppliers of funds
to commercial and industrial firms. During the period
February 4-9, 1960, the Federal Reserve reported that 21,597
commercial and industrial loans totaling ? 1,855,265,000 were
extended. The relative importance of this supply of funds
varies according to firm size with 19,890 of the above loans
being less than $100,000 in size and 256 of the above loans
*1
being more than $1,000,000 in size." Commercial bank lending 
is the largest source of funds, . most important source of 
financial advice, and in some instances, the only source 
of debt financing available for small businesses.
Although large businesses have more debt financing flexibi­
lity, commercial banks still provide them with a major 
source of debt financing and financial advice.
^Federal Reserve Bulletin 66 (April, 1980): A - 2 6 .
Commercial Loans 
Commercial loans may be secured or unsecured depend­
ing on whether collateral is required. Commercial banks and 
borrowers establish relationships involving loan packages 
that contain both price and non-price lending terms.
Secured Loans
Secured business loans are extended contingent upon 
collateral; such as accounts receivables, inventories, real 
estate, stock, or bonds; being pledged to guarantee loan 
payment. The collateral acts to reduce risk since in the 
event of default, the bank may take possession of the col­
lateral.
Collateral on loans may be used to transfer credit 
risk from the bank to either the borrower or a third party, 
such as a cosigner, since the risk of default on the prin­
cipal payment and the interest payment decrease. Other 
reasons to require collateral are because collateral is 
readily available, traditionally required, and complete and 
accurate credit information is unavailable.^
Unsecured Loans
Unsecured loans, noncollateralized short term loans, 
are extended to firms having the highest creditworthiness.
2
Oliver G. Wood, Jr., Commercial Banking: Practice
and Policy (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1978), p. 203.
typically as lines of credit and revolving credit agreements. 
Unsecured commercial loans are extended primarily to insure 
businesses of having adequate financial resources during 
peak seasonal demand. As business activity increases to 
satisfy seasonal demand, increases in working capital re­
quirements may be financed by unsecured loans that are re­
paid by the resulting cash flow.^
,i.iOan Pricing
Tight money and historically high and volatile in­
terest rates experienced during the 1970's caused commercial 
banks to re-evaluate pricing policies. The terms of loan 
packages are affected by the relationship between the bank 
and the customer.
Loan Pricing Policies
Commercial bank loans are priced according to the 
riskiness of the loan, time to maturity, and market competi­
tion. An increase in risk and time to maturity and a de­
crease in competition exert an upward pressure on prices, 
ceteris paribus, while a decrease in risk and time to ma­
turity and an increase in competition exert a downward 
pressure on prices.
^John'M. Mason, Financial Management of Commercial 
Banks (Boston: Warren, Gorham and Lamont, 1979), p p . 258-260.
10
Commercial banks offer customers a variety of ser­
vices ranging from the traditional aspects of lending and 
deposits to other services such as the management of and/or 
advice concerning a customer's investment portfolio and pro­
viding for lines of credit. The pricing policy of a com­
mercial bank depends on the bank-customer relationship and 
which aspects of the relationship, deposit, loans, or other 
services, the customer uses.^ Often the collection of ser­
vices which comprises a specific customer relationship is 
sold together with some services being a prerequisite for 
other services in a tie-in sale. For example, a deposit 
balance may be a prerequisite for a line of credit.^
Money market conditions during the 1970's led to 
a realization that loan prices should be measured according
^Ibid., p p . 261-62.
^Donald R. Hodgman, Commercial Bank Loan and Invest­
ment Policy (Champaigh: Bureau of Economic and Business
Research, University of Illinois, 1963), pp. 99-101.
^Neil B. Murphy, A Study of Wholesale Banking Beha- 
vior (Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1969), pp.
49-52.
11
to the total yield on the loan. The use of total yield 
recognized that banks should be compensated for maintaining 
sufficient liquidity to service short term agreements and 
for providing funds as loans. Actual measurement of the 
total yield is a function of the loan size, interest rate, 
compensating balance, and fees, which are all interchange­
able in the pricing structure.^
Empirical Evidence
Empirical studies confirm that loan pricing is a 
function of interest rates, compensating balances, and 
fees. The trade-off between the variables along with a 
bank's pricing policy is affected by the customer's long 
term relationship with the bank.
Financing Small Business
The relationship between the size of a loan and 
the interest rate charged was extensively researched in 
1958 in a report. Financing Small Business, prepared by the 
Federal Reserve System. Although the focus of the study was 
on the extent to which loan size is related to default risk, 
the conclusions are enlightening as to how the size of loans
^William H. Baughn and Charles E. Walker, eds., 
The Bankers' Handbook (Homewood, Illinois: Dow Jones-
Irwin, 1978), p. 619.
12
affects interest rates.
The study compared loans extended to small firms 
with loans extended to larger firms under the presumption 
that loans to small firms will on the average be smaller 
than loans to large firms. Comparison of default rates be­
tween small and large loans showed that small firms have 
more financial difficulty, worse financial ratios, even 
during periods of economic expansion, and higher default 
rates. Credit agencies recognize this trend and generally 
give small firms worse credit ratings than large firms.
The available evidence indicated that the credit 
risk on loans to small firms was higher than the credit risk 
for larger firms. However higher interest rates were char­
ged on small loans than on large loans to compensate for 
more credit risk and to pay for a higher cost per dollar of
g
loan on small loans.
Jacobs' Study
Using linear regression analysis to test the rela­
tionship between bank market structure and prices charged to 
customers, two models were developed to determine the impact
o
U.S. Congress, Report to the Committees on Banking 
and Currency and the Select Committees on Small Business, 
Financing and Small Business by the Federal Reserve System, 
85th Congress, 2a sess., April 11, 1958.
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of the services provided to customers and market structure 
on interest rates and deposit balances. While recognizing 
that banks are also compensated through fees, a regression 
on fees was not included since fees are relatively unim­
portant as a source of bank income.
The regression analysis was performed on all busi­
ness loans in this sample, noncollateralized business loans, 
and business loans 100 percent or more collateralized.
Using the interest rate as the dependent variable, the re­
gression on all customers indicated that loan size, bank 
size, branching restrictions, business size, population 
increase, total bank deposits in SMSA, concentration of 
deposits, mean deposit size, deposit fluctuations, length 
of lending arrangement, time to maturity, and account 
activity significantly affects the interest rate on loans. 
This result supports interest rates as being determined 
through package arrangements that -are described by the
customer relationship with the bank and the bank market 
9
structure.
The differences between noncollateralized and col­
lateralized loans indicated that credit risk is independent
^Donald P. Jacobs, Business Loan Costs and Bank 
Market Structure: An Empirical Estimate of Their Relations
CNew York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1971), p. 59
14
of loan size for collateralized loans, but important for 
establishing interest rates for uncollateralized loans. 
Additionally, the long term relationship between banks and 
customers receiving collateralized loans is less likely to 
be profitable than with customers receiving noncollatera­
lized loans.
Using mean deposit size as the dependent variable, 
loan size, business size, bank size, account activity, time 
to maturity, and interest rates were found to be important 
determinates of the mean deposit size when testing all 
business loans. Differences between the noncollateralized 
and 100 percent or more collateralized loans indicated that 
business size, time to maturity, and interest rate were 
important determinants of deposit size for noncollatera­
lized loans. These results imply that the relationship be­
tween banks and customers receiving noncollateralized loans 
is more comprehensive and the pricing structure encompasses 
greater interdependence of the loan terms 
Hester Studies
The results of (1) a survey on a small number of 
large banks conducted in 1955 by the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System, and (2) a survey in 1972 by
l^Ibid., p. 32. 
^^Ibid., pp. 44-55.
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the Federal Reserve System were analyzed to determine how 
the relationship between the bank and customer affects the 
terms of lending.
Bank and Federal Reserve System Survey of 1955 . Regression 
analysis and subsequent canonical correlation analysis was 
performed on the data to develop statistical support for a 
loan offer function. The regression analysis on the commer­
cial bank data indicated that the interest rate will in­
crease, maturity will decrease, loan amount will de­
crease, and the likelihood of loan collateral will increase 
if:
(1) Average losses have increased over the period 
three to five years prior to the loan or ave­
rage net profits have increased over the 
period three to five years prior, to the loan, 
ceteris paribus.
(2) The firm's average deposit balance declined
during the year prior to loan extension, 
ceteris paribus.
(3) The firm's current ratio declined at the end
of the fiscal year immediately prior to loan
extension, ceterus paribus.
(4) The length of time that the firm continuously 
had maintained deposits at the lending bank 
declined, ceteris paribus.
(5) The prime interest rate had declined.
(5) The ratio of average losses over the period
three to five years prior to the loan to total 
assets at the end of the fiscal year immediately 
prior to the loan increased, or the ratio of
16
average net profits over the period three to 
five years prior to the loan to total assets 
at the end of the fiscal year immediately 
prior to the loan decreased.
The regression analysis on the Federal Reserve Sys­
tem survey investigated the effects of specific borrower 
and bank characteristics on lending terms and showed that
(1) An increase in total assets of a firm will 
tend to decrease the interest rate, increase 
the maturity, increase the loan size,
and decrease the likelihood of the loan being 
collateralized, ceteris paribus. Banks tend 
to associate business size with default risk,
(2) An increase in the bank size will tend to in­
crease the interest rate and the likelihood 
of the loan being collateralized, ceteris 
paribus.
(3) Borrowers located in the same city as lenders 
tend to have lower interest rates, longer 
maturities, and a smaller likelihood of theno
loan being collateralized.
Results from the canonical correlation analysis, 
which was performed on both the bank and Federal Reserve 
System data, provided insight into the substituability be­
tween interest rates, loan sizes, and maturity dates. The 
trade-off between these lending terms evident from the ana­
lysis is that increases in maturity tend to be off-set
D o n a l d  D. Hester, "Customer Relationships and 
Terms of Loans: Evidence From a Pilot Survey," Journal of
Money, Banking, and Credit 2 (August, 1979), pp. 352-55.
l^Ibid., pp. 290-10.
17
by decreases in the loan sizes and increases in interest
rates. Increases in the luan size tend to be off-set by
increases in the interest rates, and decreases in the
maturity tend to be off-set by increases in loan sizes
14
and decreases in interest rates.
Federal Reserve SystemnSurvey of 1972. In 1972 the Federal 
Reserve Board collected data on.the terms of bank lending 
for 1,072 loans made by 62 banks. Regression analysis was 
used to investigate the relationship between the bank and 
the customer's financial and banlcing relationship characteris­
tics. The regression analysis showed that:
(1) Lower interest rates and larger loans can be 
expected with larger borrower deposits.
(2) Loans made under commitments can be expected 
to have lower interest rates.
(3) Customers previously receiving loans can be ex­
pected to receive lower interest rates.
(4) Customers previously receiving loans can be 
expected to be given shorter maturities.
(5) New loans to previously highly profitable cus­
tomers can be expected to have higher interest 
rates, longer maturities, and larger amounts.
(6) Firms having higher current asset to total 
asset ratios can be expected to receive lower 
interest rates.
(7) Firms receiving collateralized loans are less
^ 4 b i d . , pp. 211-13.
18
Likely to have a large amount of working cap­
ital.
(8) Larger firms can be expected to receive lower 
interest rates, larger loans, and fewer col­
lateralized loans .
(9) Firms with high depreciation costs can be ex­
pected to receive higher interest rates and 
longer maturities.
In general business loans tend to be part of an 
overall long term relationship between banks and their cus­
tomers. The lending and loan size decisions are independent 
of interest rates and collateral requirements, which are 
used to compensate for credit risk. Finally, the larger 
and/or more financially secure firms are able to obtain more 
favorable credit terms in the form of lower interest rates, 
larger loans, and a lower frequency of collateral due to the 
reduced credit risk.^^
Survey of Terms of Bank Lending
In a report on the 1977 Quarterly Survey of Terms of 
Bank Lending conducted by the Federal Reserve System, Boltz 
and Campbell examined the relationship between nominal in­
terest rates and (1) fixed versus floating interest rates,
(2) loan commitments and fees, (3) collateral, and (4)loan 
size.
Donald D. Hester, "Customer Relationships and Terms 
of Loans: Evidence From a Pilot Survey," Journal of Money,
Banking and Credit 2 (August, 1979), pp. 352-55.
19
Fixed Versus Floating Interest Rates. An interest rate that 
is fixed remains constant throughout the life of the loan, 
and an interest rate that floats is allowed to vary through­
out the life of the loan in accordance with a predetermined 
economic indicator such as the prime rate.
The pricing difference between fixed and floating 
interest rates is a function of the yield curve.- If short 
term rates are expected to increase, a premium should be 
paid by borrowers for fixed rate contracts, ceteris oari- 
bus, to obtain an interest rate that is expected to be below 
the market yield in the future. If short term rates are 
expected to decrease, a premium should be paid by the bor­
rower for floating rate contracts, ceteris paribus, to avoid 
having an interest rate that is expected to be above the 
market yield in the future.
In the survey of terms of lending, major regional 
banks charged premiums for fixed rate contracts. This coin­
cides with what would have been predicted since the yield 
curve during 1977 was upward sloping. However, no clear 
relationship between fixed rate loan contracts and premiums 
could be identified for the large money center banks. The
^^Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 
Innovations in Bank Loan Contracting: Recent Evidence, by
Paul Boltz and Tim S. Campbell, 1979, p. 7.
20
ambiguity in the results may be attributable to risk dif­
ferences between borrowers and other unknown differences in 
the loan contracts.
Loan Commitments and Commitment Fees. A loan commitment 
is an agreement by a bank to lend money to a borrower in 
the future and the commitment fee is the explicit cost to 
the customer of the bank's service. Loan commitments may 
be fixed rate, where the interest rate is predetermined, or 
variable rate, where the interest rate varies with the prime 
rate. Commitments are used by banks to establish long­
term relationships with customers and by borrowers to se­
cure future financing.
The Survey of Bank Lending Terms' Results indicated 
that customers receiving loans at interest rates below or 
high above the prime rate are less likely to have a loan 
commitment in the contractual agreement than customers re­
ceiving loans at or moderately above the prime rate. 
Although the reason for this occurrence is unclear, sug­
gested possibilities are that customers receiving below 
the prime rate loans are high quality, low risk and do not 
need a commitment covenant. Customers receiving loans at 
interest rates high above the prime rate possibly cannot 
afford the cost of the commitment.
^^Ibid., p. 27-28
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Commitment fees were found to be seldom used for
short-term loans, but more frequently used for long-term
loans. Since fees may be used in lieu of compensating
balances, requiring fees on long-term loans may reflect
an effort to avoid reducing a firm's long-term liquidity
18while obtaining revenue for the bank.
Collateral. Collateral is an asset the debtor agrees to 
forfeit in the event of loan default. Used to make debt 
obligations self-enforcing through the threat of reposses­
sion upon default, collateral has implicit costs, which in­
clude the requirement of additional contractual stipula­
tions and the debtor's loss of ownership rights or loss of 
title and possession of collateral while the debt is out­
standing.^^ The logic and conditions for the use of col­
lateral may be stated as
"...if collateral is to be used, default risk must 
be positive. Since default is relevant to the 
creditor only if it is costly, the use of col­
lateral implies the existence of collection costs: 
it must be costly for the creditor to gain owner­
ship of the debtor's assets and these costs must 
be lower if a security agreement is in force at
^^Ibid., pp. 29-30.
1 q
Daniel K. Benjamin, "The Use of Collateral to En­
force Debt Contracts," Economic Inquiry 16 (July, 1973), 
p. 334.
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the time of default. The existence of a security 
agreement, however, implies some attenuation of the 
debtor's rights to the collateral during the debt 
contract. An alternative to the use of an asset
as collateral is its sale to obtain the requisite
funds. Thus, if an asset is to be used as col­
lateral, its sale must be costly and these costs
must be greater than the foregone value of the 
rights attenuated by the security a g r e e m e n t . 20
In this sense two types of collateral that can be 
identified may be referred to as tangible and intangible. 
Tangible collateral is an asset that can be physically re­
possessed and sold in a secondary market. Ceteris paribus, 
loan amounts greater than the net selling price of the col­
lateral in the secondary market can be unprofitable since 
borrowers in effect can sell the collateral to the creditor 
by defaulting on the loans. Ceteris paribus, loan amounts 
less than the net selling price will be repaid. In general, 
when the loan balance is less than the net selling price of 
the collateral the choice of whether to repay the loan will 
have a value and the default rate will be zero. Loan boun­
daries will be Pn/(1 + r), where r is the opportunity rate, and
P , vÆiich is the value of the collateral to the borrower. The 
n
interest rate of loans less than Pq/(1 + r) will be r and 
will increase as the loan size approaches P^ due to the 
increase default risk.
^°Ibid.. p. 335.
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Intangible collateral may also be a service, such
as electrical servine^ tharir^ 
realizeable or market value to the creditor. Credit ratings, 
for example, are not tradeable and have no potential mone­
tary gain to the creditor in the event of default, but 
serve as an incentive for a debtor to repay loans. The 
loan boundaries will be P^/(1 + r) and P' where P^ now is 
the value of the intangible collateral to the borrower. As 
the loan size increases above P'n/(1 + r), interest rate will 
increase since the risk of default is positive and creditors
will require a default premium as compensation for the in- 
21creased risk.
The results of the Survey of Terms of Bank Lending 
may be interpreted with respect to both tangible and intan­
gible collateral. In the survey, the majority of short term 
loans were unsecured, implying that creditors perceived 
that the loss by firms of something intangible was great 
enough to insure repayment on short-term debts. Collateral 
occurred more frequently with term loans, implying that loss 
by firms of intangible assets was not great enough to suf­
ficiently reduce credit risk. In general, collateralization
was used less frequently by more creditworthy customers, but
22
was accompanied by higher interest rates.
-^Ibid., pp. 336-37.
^^Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, pp.
36-37.
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Loan S i z e . An inverse relationship was evident between loan
size and interest rates with larger loans being priced at
prime or below prime and small loans being priced above
prime. These results imply that larger loans are extended
to more creditworthy customers and that the high cost of
23servicing small loans is passed on to the borrower.
Loan Profitability .Model 
As part of the study to identify the relationship 
between loan costs and bank market structure, Jacobs devel­
oped a multiperiod customer profitability model. Using the 
net present value method of analyzing loan requests, wealth 
maximization through maximization of discounted long-run 
profits remained the goal of the bank.
The multiperiod model for a single customer was 
expressed as:
N
Y
T &t(RtL " ^tA - Rtp) - *-tL °t (L-rr) R. - Yj-A + l Sj..: 
NPV = I  1 = 1
(1 + K)t 
where :
NPV = Net present value of stream of expected profits 
L^ = Loan balance during period t 
R ^  = Loan interest rate during period t
23
Ibid., p 32.
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= Banks cost of acquiring a dollar of lendable funds 
during period t 
R^r Probability of default during period t
= Cost of extending loan, including credit search 
and handling costs 
= Customers mean deposit balance during period t 
rr = Reserve requirement on demand deposits during
period t
R^ = Value of a dollar of demand deposit during period t
- Change in assets average yield during period t 
A = Total bank assets during period t
N
ZS . = Net fees from services to customer j during 
period t 
K = Discount factor
Lf(RtL”R^“RtR^ = Net revenue expected from loan 
D^(l-rr)R^ = Value received from customers deposit bal­
ance
Y^A = Change in revenue from banks assets
As was previously discussed, banks receive compen­
sation from interest income, deposit balances, and fees.
Each of these pricing mechanisms is represented in the model 
along with the off-setting costs of providing the loan. Net 
income interest income, ^t(^tL~^A~^tR^’ off-set by loan 
extension costs, C^^; the value of deposit balances, 
D^(l-rr)R^^ is off-set by the change in revenue from the
26
b a n k ' s  assets, Y^A, which includes the bank's cost of li­
quidity necessary to satisfy loan commitments; and net fee
tj
N 24
revenue, I S^-, for non-loan services.
i=l
As with other NPV analyses, the decision rule is to 
extend credit to the customer if the N P V > 0 and reject the 
credit request if the N P V < 0. The model incorporates a 
comprehensive bank-customer relationship including multi­
ple facets of bank compensation and customer services.
The model implies that customers do not have to be profit­
able in each period, but must be profitable over the long 
term for a bank to service their needs.
Problems with Conventional Models 
Problems inherent in traditional loan analysis are 
identifying the applicant's payment pattern, identifying the 
relevant cash flows, and determining the lending institution's 
cost of capital.
Identifying Payment Pattern 
The applicant's payment pattern is a relevant factor 
in loan analysis since the earlier a payment is received the 
sooner the lending institution can reinvest the funds. 
Applicants who make payments on time may be rewarded with
24
Jacobs, pp. 10-14.
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more favorable lending terms while poorer quality appli­
cants may be given more restrictive lending terms to compen­
sate the lending institution the increased credit risk 
exposure.
Loan valuation typically does not address the p r o ­
blem of quantitatively assigning accurate patterns of pay­
ment to account for each applicant's characteristics
although these characteristics may be useful for estimating
25the promptness of loan payments. Although probabilities 
of bad debts and general risk categories are used, a fur­
ther useful refinement that adjusts for the probabilities 
of payments has not been developed.
Identifying Relevant Cash Flows 
The amount of investment in loans by a lending in­
stitutions is heavily influenced by the lending terms, with 
lenient lending terms resulting in a higher investment in 
loans and restrictive lending terms resulting in a smaller 
investment in loans. Altering policy toward any of the 
lending terms will change the level of investment and the 
pattern of cash flows from the loan portfolio. Although the
25
Credit scoring has successfully been used to de t ­
ermine the quality of consumer loan applicants, but has 
rarely been used to analyze business loan applications due 
to the more complex terms of lending.
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incremental profitability of a policy change is dependent
on the incremental cash flow pattern resulting from the
change, identifying the relevant cash flows and estimating
26a reliable pattern is imprecise.
The conventional approach is to compare the incre­
mental revenues resulting from the policy change with the 
incremental expenses to determine the marginal profit­
ability of the change. The marginal profitability is for­
mulated as
Marginal _ Incremental _ carrying Cost of Incremental
Profitability Contribution investment in Loans
Incremental Bad 
Debt Expense
Other costs are not included since they are considered in-
■ u 27significant.
This approach has not, however, been received w ith­
out criticism. Changes in policy variables that lengthen 
the maturity date may cause an increase in explicit and im-
26
Harlan R. Patterson, "New Life in the Management 
of Corporate Receivables," Credit and Financial Management, 
72 (February 1970): 17.
27joseph Atkins and Yong H. Kim, "Comment and Cor­
rection: Opportunity Cost in the Evaluation of Investment
in Accounts Receivables," Financial Management, 6 (Winter 
1977) : 72.
pliait costs. The explicit cost is the cost of the in­
cremental investment in the loans. While the conventional
method includes the calculation for the explicit cost of a
28
policy change, the implicit cost calculation is omitted.
Cost of Capital 
An accurate estimation of the cost of capital is 
an important variable affecting the lending institution's 
optimal mix of assets and investments. An inaccurate 
specification of the cost of capital may lead to incorrect 
financial decisions resulting in a decrease in shareholder 
'wealth. Traditional methods of measuring the cost of cap­
ital, however, have relied on the measurement of nebulous 
concepts and have used crude estimation methods. In the 
banking literature the cost of capital has received only 
cursory attention.
The cost of capital is the hurdle rate, or minimum 
rate, that new investments must earn for the lending insti­
tution to be profitable and keep shareholder wealth constant. 
In financial literature both the weighted average cost of 
capital and the risk adjusted cost of capital have been
28
Tirlochan S. Walia, "Explicit and Implicit Cost of 
Changes in the Level of Accounts Receivable and the Credit 
Policy Decision of the Firm," Financial Management (Winter 
1977): 77.
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suggested as acceptable methods for determining an appro­
priate hurdle rate. In some cases both approaches yield
29
the same result.
Two commonly used methods for estimating the cost
of a lending institution's funds are the average cost and
the marginal cost approaches. Using the average cost of
funds approach, all interest charges on liabilities are
summed and the total divided by the total funds raised.
The appeal of this approach lies in its simplicity, but
the average cost of funds approach has been criticized
since historical costs are not reflective of current costs
during periods of volatile interest rates. When the average
cost understates current funds acquisition costs and when
interest rates are decreasing the average cost overstates
30
funds acquisition costs,
A type of weighted average cost of capital, the 
marginal cost of capital is the weighted cost of borrowed 
and equity funds. The cost of borrowed funds is the current 
annual borrowing rate adjusted for reserve requirements and
25clenn V. Henderson, Jr., "In Defense of the Weighted 
Average Cost of Capital," Financial Management, VIII (Au­
tumn, 1979) : 58.
30Ronald D. Watson, "The Marginal Cost of Funds Con­
cept in Banking," Journal of Banking Research 8 (Autumn,
1977), 138-39.
31
float and the cost of equity is the current required return 
on shareholder investment. Since all costs are market deter­
mined, this method reflects current rates in the short term 
market, but has been criticized for not including all rele­
vant costs, not considering alternative sources of funds, 
and not recognizing the difficulty of estimating the cost 
of equity.3^
An alternative marginal cost calculation, the real 
marginal cost recognizes the importance of including all 
relevant costs, leverage risk adjustments, market determined 
equity costs for both new and old equity holders, and value 
maximization criterion in decision making. The real margi­
nal cost calculation is a summation of the explicit and the 
implicit costs of each source of funds. The explicit cost 
of funds is the dollar cost of acquiring and servicing ac­
quired funds and includes applicable cash interest and 
dividend payments, servicing costs, acquisition costs, re­
serve requirements and float, and deposit insurance. The
implicit cost of funds is the change in capital costs caused
32
by changes in leverage risk.
^^Ibid., p. 139. 
32ibid., pp. 140-141.
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The marginal cost of funds has been shown to be 
equal to the real marginal cost of funds plus a risk adjust­
ment which compensates for the difference between the risk 
of the investment and the average risk of the bank's assets, 
The marginal cost of capital approach has been shown to be 
a superior method since determining the risk adjustment in
the real marginal cost of capital is imprecise and the ad-
33justment for leverage risk may be conceptually incorrect.
^^Edward A. Dyl, "The Marginal Cost of Funds Contro­
versy," Journal of Banking Research 9 (Autumn, 1978), 192.
CHAPTER III
CONTINGENT CLAIMS APPLICATIONS TO COMMERCIAL BANK LOANS
The purposes of this chapter are (1) to review the 
development of contingent claims theory and (2) to provide 
a link between contingent claims theory and commercial bank 
loan analysis that enables the research hypotheses to be 
developed. The research hypotheses are based on previous 
empirical commercial bank loan studies and contingent claims 
theory,
Development of Contingent Claims Theory 
Contingent claims theory is an extension of put and 
call options analysis and views the value of an asset as 
being dependent on the characteristics of another asset. ^  
The succession of proposed models to value options, given
^A call option is an option to purchase shares of 
stock at a specified price within a specified time period.
A put option is an option to sell shares of stock at a 
specified price within a specified time period. European 
options can only be exercised at maturity while American 
options can be exercised anytime during the life of the option
33
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2
in Smith, preceded the pathbreaking Black-Scholes model 
published in 1973, which was subsequently clarified and 
extended by Merton. Since the development of the Black- 
Scholes model, significant theoretical advances have been 
made, but only a few empirical studies have been completed 
to support contingent claims analysis. Application of con­
tingent claims analysis to loans has been recognized by 
Black-Scholes,^ Galai and Masulis,^ Smith,^ and Copeland 
and Weston.^
Merton's Option Price Restrictions 
Equilibrium price restrictions have been defined by 
Merton that limit the range of call option prices and have 
been shown to be consistent with option models. The restric­
tions, which depend on portfolio dominance, are:
^Clifford W. Smith, "Option Pricing: A Review,"
Journal of Financial Economics, 3 (January-March, 1976): 
15-70.
3
Fisher Black and Myron Scholes, "The Pricing of 
Options and Corporate Liabilities," Journal of Political 
Economy, 81 (May-June, 1973): 649.
^Dan Galai and Ronald W. Masulis, "The Option Pri­
cing Model and the Risk Factor of Stock," Journal of Poli­
tical Economics, 3 (January-February, 1976), 61-70.
^Smith, p. 5.
^Thomas E. Copeland and J. Fred Weston, Financial 
Theory and Corporate Policy (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wes-
ley, 1979), p. 4 I8 .
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1. "Call prices are non-negative.
2. "At the expiration date, t, the call will be 
priced at the maximum of either the difference 
between the stock price and the exercise price,
S*-X, or zero.
3. "At any date before the maturity date an American 
call option must sell for at least the difference 
between the stock price and the exercise price.
4. "If two American calls differ only as to expira­
tion date, then the one with the longer term to 
maturity, must sell for no less than that of
the shorter term to maturity, ? 2 .
5. "An American call must be priced no lower than an 
identical European call.
5. "If two options differ only in exercise price, then
the option with the lower exercise price must sell 
for a price which is no less than the option with 
the higher exercise price to avoid dominance.
7. "The common stock is at least equivalent to a per­
petual call (i.e., T = ) with a zero exercise price.
8. "An American call on a non-dividend paying stock 
will not be exercised before the expiration date.
9. "A perpetual option on a non-dividend paying stock 
must sell for the same price as the stock.
10. "The call price is a convex function of the exer­
cise price.
11. "If the call price can be expressed as a differen­
tial function of the exercise price, the derivative 
must be negative and be no larger in absolute value 
than the price of a pure discount bond of the same 
maturity.
12. "With dividend payments on the stock premature exer-
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cise of an American call may o c c u r .
In developing these option price restrictions, 
Merton compared the return on two portfolios using the 
dominance principle. Portfolio 1 is dominant over port­
folio 2 if the return on portfolio 1 is not less than the 
return on portfolio 2 for all possible outcomes, and if the 
return on portfolio 1 is greater than the return for port­
folio 2 in at least one possible outcome. In equilibrium 
no portfolios would be dominant since investors would bid 
up the price of dominant portfolios until the dominance 
was eliminated. Correspondingly, the demand for dominated 
portfolios would fall, as would price, until they are no 
longer dominated.®
Black-Scholes Model 
In a seminal article in 1973, Black and Scholes 
presented an option valuation model that has become widely 
accepted. The model has been shown to be consistent with 
existing finance theory and has been modified and applied 
to other situations.
^Smith, 7-14. This is only a partial list of the 
restrictions. For the complete list see Robert C. Merton, 
"Theory of Rational Option Pricing," Bell Journal of Eco­
nomics and Management, IV (Spring 1973): 141-83.
^Ibid., p. 7.
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Model Development
Under the assumptions of the Black-Scholes model, 
investors can create a riskless portfolio by combining a 
stock with European call options. The appropriate combina­
tion of stock and options to create a riskless hedged port­
folio relies on adjusting the number of options to changes 
in the stock price, time to expiration of the option, 
variance rate of return on the stock, exercise price of 
the option, and risk free rate of return. Assuming that:
1. "The short term interest rate is known and con­
stant through time.
2. "The stock price follows a random walk in contin­
uous time with a variance rate proportional to 
the square of the stock price. Thus the distri­
bution of possible stock prices at the end of any 
finite interval is log-normal. The variance rate 
of the return on the stock is constant.
3. "The stock pays no dividends or other distribu­
tions .
4. "The option is European, that is, it can only be 
exercised at maturity.
5. "There are no transaction costs in buying or 
selling the stock or the option.
6. "It is possible to borrow any fraction of the 
price of the security to buy it or to hold it, 
at the short term interest rate.
7. "There are no penalties to short selling. A 
seller who does not own a security will simply 
accept the price of the security from a buyer, 
and will agree to settle him an amount equal to
38
the price of the security on that date m9
The model is
In (S/X+ {r+(g V2)} T
a / r
_rt
-Xe N In(s/X) + {r-(g^/2)}T
a/r
C = S'N 
where :
S = Stock price at time t
X = Exercise price of option
a ^  = Variance rate of return on stock
T = Time to expiration of option
r = Risk free rate of return
. N [] = Cumulative normal probability distribution
All variables in the model are directly observable, except 
the variance of the rate of return on the stock, which can 
be approximated through historical analysis of the expected 
return of the stock. The appropriate hedge ratio, or the 
appropriate number of options to be held with a share 
of stock to return the risk free rate of return, is C , 
where C ' is the partial derivative of the option value,
C. This model is superior to previous models since unob­
servable variables, such as the expected return on the 
stock, expected return on the option and market risk aversion,
^Black and Scholes, 640-41,
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do not appear.^0
Analysis of Variables
Changes in the variables comprising the model can 
be investigated to determine the subsequent change in the 
value of the option by taking the partial derivative of the 
Black-Scholes model with respect to each variable in the 
model.
1. The value of the option, C, increases if the stock 
price increases.
1Ç = N 
95
In (S/X)+( g2/2) T
a/r
> 0
2 . The value of the option, C, increases if the exer­
cise, X, decreases.
3Ç = _e-rt N
9X
In (5/X) +{r-( g 2/2)} T
g/r~ < 0
The value of the option, C, increases if the time 
until expiration, T, lengthens.
3Ç =
9T
Xe -rt _S_ N
a/r
ln(S/X) +(r-(g^/2)}T
g / r
+ rN ln(S/X) +{r-(g ,/2)}T g/f > 0
The value of the option, C, increases if the risk­
less rate of interest, r, increases.
—  = T'Xe'^t N 
9r
In (S/x) +{r-(q^/2)} T
a/ r 2g
> 0
10Galai and Masulis, p. 75.
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5. The value of the option, C, increases if the 
variance rate, a increases.
d v j  v-4-
— 2 = X e ^ % 'da
In (S/X) +{r-o-/2}T 
a/F
Where N ' = standard normal density function at 
d^ and dg
These relationships are consistent with the restrictions 
imposed on the range of option values by Merton and with the 
capital asset pricing model variable relationships.^^ 
Extensions of Black-Scholes Model
The Black-Scholes model has been expanded to allow 
wider applicability by relaxing the assumptions of the mod­
el. Black and Scholes assumed that dividends were not paid 
on the stock during the life of the option. By relaxing 
the restriction on dividend payments during the life of 
the option, the proportional dividend model allows divi­
dends to be paid continuously, but is only applicable to 
European call options. Another modification of the 
Black-Scholes model, the' differential tax model, allows 
differential tax rates between capital gains and ordinary 
income in addition to continuous dividend payments. The 
variable interest rate model allows interest rates to vary 
over the life of the option and can be applied to both
^^Galai and Masulis, p. 75.
^^Sraith, p. 26. 
l^Ibid., p. 27-28.
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European and American options since dividends are assumed not 
to be paid on the stock during the option's life.^^ Roll has 
developed a model to value American call options when the 
underlying stock makes dividend payments during the option's
life.15
Holding the assumptions made by Black and Scholes in­
tact, a pricing model for European put options was developed. 
The put option pricing model can, however, be modified to 
allow continuous dividend payments, tax differential between 
capital and gains and ordinary income, and variable interest 
rates.
Applications of Black-Scholes Model
The Black-Scholes equation has been used to value 
contingent claims other than stock options. The debt and 
equity components of a firm having only common stock and 
pure discount bonds having a restrictive covenant prohibi­
ting dividend payments until bond maturity have been valued 
using the Black-Scholes equation. In this situation, stock­
holders sell the firm's assets to the bondholders with the 
option to repurchase the assets by paying the bond
l^Ibid., p. 28.
15%. Roll, "An Analytical Valuation Formula for Un­
protected American Call Options on Stocks with Known Divi­
dends," Journal of Financial Economics, 5 (November 1977), 
pp. 251-58.
l^Robert C. Merton, "On the Pricing of Corporate: 
Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates," Journal of.
Finance 24 (May 1974); pp. 449-70.
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obligation.
Changes in any of the functional variables com­
prising the model may change the ownership division be­
tween debt and equity. The effect of changes in corporate 
policies such as the impact of investment decision on 
nondiversible risk, expected return, and distribution of
ownership between debt and equity has been analyzed using
18the Black-Scholes model.
The Black-Scholes model has been used to examine the 
relationship between the firm's debt, the variables com­
prising the model, and how changes in the variables affect 
debt value. The yield to maturity and risk premium on 
bonds can also be determined.
Dual closed-end funds, which are created by is­
suing income shares and capital shares have been valued 
using the Black-Scholes model. The capital shareholders 
receive very little until expiration, at which time they 
are paid residual funds after income shareholders are paid, 
and have similar characteristics to European options of
^"^Black and Scholes, pp. 549-50.
^®Smith, pp. 43-45.
^^Merton, "On the Pricing of Corporate Debt,"
pp. 449-70.
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dividend paying s t o c k . ^0
Fixed rate loan commitments have been analyzed as 
contingent claims. By providing customers with the right 
to borrow funds at a fixed rate within a specified time 
period, banks are selling put options giving borrowers 
the right to sell che bank debt at a fixed price. Fixed 
rate loan commitments have been modeled as options in a 
manner analogous to the Black-Scholes model, except that 
interest rates are assumed to be lognormally distributed.^^
Loan Agreements as Contingent Claims
Granting a loan can be viewed as establishing a
contingent claim and anlayzed in an options framework.
4 '
Loan agreements generally may be analyzed as call options, 
and in' some cases as combinations of puts and calls depen­
ding on the terms of the loan.
Call Option Analysis 
Loan agreements are contingent claims that provide 
funds to borrowers under a specified interest rate contract 
for a specific time period. A loan agreement may be ana-
^^Smith, pp. 45-46.
2 ]
Brit. J. Bartter and Richard J. Rendleman, Jr., 
"Fee Based Pricing of Fixed Rate Bank Loan Commitments," 
Financial .Management 8 (Spring, 1979) : p. 13.
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Lyzed from a call option perspective if, when the loan is 
granted, the borrower uses as collateral a tangible or in­
tangible asset and agrees to pay off the loan at a speci­
fic maturity date.
Loan Analysis
When a loan is extended, the borrower has the 
option of either repaying or not repaying the loan at m a ­
turity. Since call options give the owner the right to 
purchase an asset at a specified price within a specific 
time period, when a loan is granted, the lending institution 
has sold to the borrower a call option to buy the collateral 
at maturity. If the loan is paid, the borrower exercises 
the call option and retains the ownership of a tangible 
asset or the full value of an intangible asset used as col­
lateral by paying the exercise price. If the loan is not 
paid, the lending institution may take possession of the 
tangible collateral-or the borrower may lose the full value 
of the intangible collateral.
The option to retain collateral ownership will be 
exercised if the borrower places higher value on the col­
lateral than on the loan payoff, and the borrower will 
sell the collateral to the lending institution by allowing 
the option to expire and not repaying the loan when the
45
collateral value becomes less than the loan value.
Pavoff Analvsis
Assuming costless repossession and no transaction 
costs, the pay-off value of the loan is dependent on the 
market value of the collateral. Contingent claims analy­
sis of a loan agreement can be analyzed with a pay-off 
graph as in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1 
Payoff Graph for Loan
Payoff
Collateral Value
Figure 1 shows that if the market value of the col­
lateral is greater than the maturity value of the loan, E, 
the borrower will repay and the lending institution will 
earn a profit equal to the interest earned on the loan, or 
the difference between the loan payoff and the loan size.
If the market value of the collateral is less than the m ar­
ket value of the loan, the lending institution may repossess 
the collateral and, assuming a costless repossession and no 
put option available, have a pay-off decreasing steadily 
with the market value of the collateral.
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Call and Put Option Combinations 
In this section it is shown that the lender has 
the equivalent of a put option on a loan if loan repayments 
are guaranteed. If the loan is guaranteed for 100% re­
payment upon default of the borrower, the lender has one 
put. If the lending institution is guaranteed a 50% 
repayment of the amount lost upon default, the lender has 
one-half put. Other fractional puts may be determined in 
an analogous manner.
Fully Guaranteed Loan
Loans that are fully guaranteed insure that the 
lender will receive full payment on the loan if the borrow­
er defaults. This arrangement is shown in Figure II.
Since the lender is guaranteed full payment, the 
pay-off is the straight line AD. Since the firm will re­
ceive 100% payment, the payoff CA, is equal to the premium 
earned on the loan, ED.
FIGURE 2 
Payoff Involving Put Option
A
Payoff B
I
E
Collateral Value
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Partially Guaranteed Loan
Loans that are partially guaranteed insure that the 
lender will receive partial payment on a defaulted loan.
In this example, the lender has insurance against 50% of 
the loss of a defaulted loan.
The expected pay-off for loans insured for 50% of 
the value of the loss is line BD in Figure II. The pay-off 
decreases less than proportionately with collateral value 
and when the collateral value is zero, the pay-off is B, 
where CB = % CA.
Research Hypotheses of Commercial Bank 
Loans as Contingent Claims 
The empirical analysis entails a statistical com­
parison between bank loan effective interest rates and 
other loan characteristics to investigate the contingent 
claims approach to analyzing commercial bank loans.
Merton's theorems on option prices and the effects of speci­
fic variables on option prices in the Black-Scholes model 
are used to generate research hypotheses.
Interest Rate
The relationship between interest rates and other 
loan characteristics has been the focus of empirical stu­
dies by Jacobs and Hester. Both studies used regression
48
analysis to identify significant factors affecting the 
level of interest rates.
The link between previous empirical studies and 
contingent claims theory of commercial bank loans lies in 
the interest rate charged on loans. In a contingent claims 
framework, an interest rate is determined through Merton's 
formulation as
= ■£ In Xv-c where :
t = time until loan maturity 
V = collateral value
C = value of option on underlying asset 
X = loan payoff
V-C - interest earned on the loan if the obligation is 
paid in full
If commercial loans can be analyzed in a contingent 
claims framework, then loan analysis should be consistent 
with observed loan interest rates and previously established 
empirical relationships. Since interest rates should be 
equivalent, loan characteristics affecting theoretical 
interest rate levels should in a contingent claims frame­
work affect observed commercial bank loan interest rates 
in the same manner. Research hypotheses relating interest 
rates to other loan characteristics are used to determine
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if contingent claims relationships are consistent with 
interest rate movements.
Loan Size
Previous empirical studies by Jacobs, Hester, and 
in the Congressional Committee report on financing small 
business showed an inverse relationship between the loga­
rithm of the loan size and interest rates. Smaller loans 
are often extended to smaller firms that have a higher pro­
bability of encountering financial difficulty. Small loans 
also have a higher per dollar loaned cost than large loans. 
The higher relative administrative costs cause higher in­
terest rates for smaller loans.
In contingent claims analysis of lending decisions, 
an inverse relationship between the logarithm of loan sizes 
and interest rates can be justified in two ways. The com­
mittee report on financing small business reported a direct 
relationship between the percent of total loans extended to 
small firms and loan losses. Banks whose loans to small 
firms comprised more than 25 percent of total loans had 
greater loan losses than banks whose loans to small firms 
were 12.5 percent to 25 percent of total loans and even
greater loan losses than banks whose loans to small firms
22were less than 12.5 percent of total loans.
22U.S. Congress, p. 45.
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Implied in the comparison of loan losses to firms
size is that loans to small firms on the average are more
risky. Since, as reported by Hester, small firms obtain 
small loans and large firms large loans, then on the average
small loans can be expected to be riskier than large loans.
In a contingent claims framework, increased risk 
leads to higher option values and higher interest rates in
Anything increasing/decreasingXthe equation i = i In 
the option's value, c, will increase/decrease the interest 
rate. Accordingly, small loans, which expose lending in­
stitutions to more risk relative to large loans, increase 
option value and interest rates charged on the small loans.
Another argument supporting the inverse relation­
ship between loan size and interest rates revolves around 
the administrative costs of extending the loan. The adminis 
trative costs of loan analysis and extension are relatively 
fixed and account for the empirical observation that costs 
per dollar loaned decrease as the loan size increases. An
altered formulation of the interest rate equation that ac-
X
counts for administrative lending costs is i = ^ 1^ V-C-F
where F represents the administrative lending costs.
.Using the reformulated interest rate equation, in­
creases in the size of a loan V-C, and payoff, X, cause the 
fixed administrative costs to become a less significant fac­
tor. By including the fixed administrative lending cost in 
the equation, interest rates will be inversely related to
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loan sizes, and the research hypothesis is:
Interest rates are inversely related to the loga­
rithm of loan size.
Loan Risk
The interest rates charged to borrowers reflect, 
in part, the lending institution's concern for the time 
value of money and the credit risk of the applicant. Hold­
ing constant the time value of money, factors decreasing/ 
increasing credit risk exert downward/upward pressure on 
interest rates charged to borrowers.
In Hester's analysis of the Federal Reserve System 
survey data, the decisions to extend a loan and the size 
of a loan were found to be independent of collateral re­
quirements , which protect against default, and interest 
rates, which compensates for risk exposure. The use of 
collateral decreased credit risk by shifting the risk of 
default from the lending institution to the borrower.
Loans that are collateralized are less risky and should
23
have lower interest rates than loans with no collateral.
Theorem 7 and the subsequent corollary by Merton 
specify that the more risky the underlying asset the more 
valuable the option. The more valuable the option the 
higher the implied interest rate.^^ In support of this
23Hester, "Customers Relationship and Terms of 
Loans," p. 355.
^^Merton, "Theory of Rational Options Pricing,"
p . 148.
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relationship, Galai and Masulis have shown that option
25
values increase with the risk of the underlying security.
In terms of commercial loans, the value of a call 
option on a loan should be higher with uncollateralized 
loans than with collateralized loans since uncollateralized 
loans expose the lending institution to greater risk.
Because lending institutions are compensated for greater 
risk through higher interest rates, the research hypothesis 
is :
Uncollateralized loans have higher interest rates.
Floating Interest Rates
Few empirical studies have examined the effect that 
a floating rate loan has on the interest rate charged to 
the borrower. The only major contribution was a descrip­
tive analysis of the 1977 quarterly Survey of Terms of Bank 
Lending by Boltz and Campbell. In their study, Boltz and 
Campbell reported that the interest rate on floating rate 
loans was higher than interest rates on fixed rate loans. 
This result was unexpected since floating rate contracts 
shift the risk of interest rate changes from the lender to 
the borrower and should lower the interest rate charged to 
the borrower. Boltz and Campbell, however, suggested that 
the floating rate loans may have been extended to more risky 
borrowers than fixed rate loans and that the risk differen­
tial between borrowers was large enough to offset the
ZSgmith, 24,
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decreased risk exposure to the lender. Also suggested was 
that banks competed for customers by offering fixed rate 
loans that were lower than floating rate loans when inter­
est rates were expected to rise.
The effect of a variable rate loan on the bank is to 
hedge against interest rate risk since the interest rate on 
the loan may be renegotiated while the loan is outstanding. 
This greater flexibility by the bank increases the value 
of the loan to the bank and would be expected to decrease 
the interest rate on the loan, ceteris parabus. In the in­
terest rate equation, V-C becomes V-C+P' where P ’ is the 
value of the option to renegotiate the interest rate.
The above argument for floating interest rate con­
tracts being lower than fixed interest rate contracts as­
sumes, however, that the fixed and floating rate contracts 
are offered to customers with identical characteristics. If 
as Boltz and Campbell suggest, floating rate contracts are 
offered to more risky customers and if the increased custom­
er risk is great enough to offset the value of the floating 
rate contract to the bank, then floating rate contracts would 
have higher interest rates than fixed rate contracts. In 
this case the increased risk of lending has a stronger effect 
on the loan interest rate than the decreased interest rate risk.
In allowing elements of reality to enter the study 
and to be consistent with the Boltz and Campbell study, the 
research hypothesis is : Floating rate loans have higher in­
terest rates than fixed rate loans.
Loan Commitments 
Loan commitments, also known as lines of credit, 
allow borrowers to obtain loans at fixed prices within 
specified time periods and have been described by Bartter 
and Rendlemen as put options. When a borrower decides to
exercise the put option on the loan, debt is sold to the ■
? A
lending institution under the prearranged conditions.
Recent volatility in market conditions have caused 
loan commitments to be more risky to lenders than when 
market conditions are more stable. The profitability of 
loans made under commitment agreements may be significantly 
impaired if, for example, interest rate and/or federal re­
serve requirements substantially increase above levels 
existing when the loan commitment was negotiated.
The greater potential for loans being either less 
profitable or unprofitable due to loan commitments, and 
due to the ability of the borrower to exercise a put option 
on the lender, increases the risk of lending to the lending
Xinstitution. The interest rate equation, i = — In
^ V-C_
may be altered to encompass the added dimension of a loan 
commitment being sold to the borrower by the lending in-
Xstitution. The new formulation would be i = - In
V-C-P
Z^Bartter and Rendleman, p. 13.
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where P represents the decreased value to the Lending in­
stitution that results from selling the put option to the 
borrower and would cause the interest rate on the loan 
to increase. In this case, the put is not the simple 
putting of the asset, but putting a bundle of the asset 
and a call option.
Although Hester found commitment loans to have 
27lower interest rates, the increased risk exposure by- 
lending institution extending loans under loan commitments 
should cause compensation to the lending institution from 
fees, compensating balances, and interest rates to in­
crease. Since data on fees and compensating balances is 
not available, the only aspect of the lending institution 
that can be empirically tested is interest rates. Accord­
ingly the research hypothesis is:
Interest rates are higher for loans extended under 
loan commitments.
Demand Loans 
Demand loans give the lending institution the 
right to demand loan repayment from the borrower at any 
time during the life of the loan. Lending institutions
^"^Hester, "Customers Relationships and Terms of 
Loans," p. 35 2.
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may be justified in recalling a Loan due to changes in 
market conditions, such as an unexpected increase in the 
prime rate and/or borrower characteristics, such as 
breaking a loan covenant.
Demand loans may be viewed as a put option that 
is sold by the borrower to the lending institution since 
the lending institution has the option to put immediate 
repayment on the borrower. Ownership of this put option, 
which may be exercised at the lending institution's dis­
cretion, reduces the risk exposure of the lending institu­
tion and should cause interest rates to decrease.
The interest rate equation may be altered incor­
porate the demand loan status by including the put option, 
Xi = g  In where P represents the put option the
y-c+pj
lending institution receives from the borrower. The put
option is added in this equation, in contrast to be sub­
tracted in the loan commitment equation, because the 
lending institution is purchasing a put option with demand 
loans and selling a put option with loan commitments.
Adding the put option will cause interest rates to decrease 
as the put option becomes more valuable.
The conditions under which the bank would exercise 
their put option is if the collateral value decreased below,
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and was expected to remain below, the payoff value of the 
loan, ceteris paribus, or if the bank's required return
increased above, and was expected to remain above, the 
interest rate on the loan, ceteris paribus. The condi­
tions under which the bank's put option would be exercised 
becomes more complex if the ceteris paribus constraint is 
relaxed. If the constraint is relaxed, the decision to 
exercise the put option would not depend only on the col­
lateral value-payoff value and loan rate-required return 
relationships, but would depend on the borrower-lender 
relationship. The bank, for example, would be more likely 
to exercise the put option by requesting immediate loan 
payment if the borrower is expected to be unprofitable or 
marginally profitable than if the borrower is expected to 
be a long term profitable customer. The decision rule 
used by the bank in determining whether to exercise their 
put option would be established in a manner that was con­
sistent with their wealth maximization criteria.
Although Hester found that demand notes had higher 
interest rates, ownership of the put option on the loan 
gives the lending institution increased flexibility and 
decreased risk. Accordingly, the research hypothesis is:
Interest rates are lower if the loan is a demand note,
5o
Time to Maturity 
Securities with different maturity dates have 
different yields and are thus priced differently in the 
market. The relationship between maturity date and yield, 
known as the term structure of interest rates, may be shown 
graphically with a yield curve either having a positive, 
negative, or flat slope depending on characteristics of 
the market and the security.
By imposing a ceteris paribus constraint, the re­
lationship between yield and maturity is simple and straight­
forward. However, many complex interdependent factors af­
fecting the shape of the yield curve, such as the maturity 
date, coupon interest rate, call provisions, tax status, 
and risk, must be considered in any empirical analysis 
concerning the relationship between yield and maturity.
The complexity of the real-world relationship between yield 
and maturity has led to the development of contingent claims
and arbitrage term structure models. Rendleman and Bart-
OQ 29
ter^° and Brennan and Schwartz have developed contingent
28 Richard J. Rendleman, Jr. and Brit. J. Bartter,
"The Pricing of Options on Debt Securities," Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analvsis, 15 (March, 1980), 
pp. 11-24.
^%ichael J. Brennan and Edwardo S. Schwartz, "Savings 
Bonds, Retractable .Bonds and Callable Bonds," Journal of 
Financial Economics, 5 (August, 1977), pp. 67-68.
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d a i m s  models that value riskless bonds. A contingent 
claims model that is different from the Black-Scholes 
model is needed for pricing bonds since the price of bonds 
is not likely to follow any well-defined probability dis­
tribution due to the effects of the bond-specific coupon 
and maturity characteristics. Richard^^ and Dothan^^ have 
developed arbitrage models that consider investor's tastes 
and preferences, the real interest rate, the expected in­
flation rate, and the equilibrium prices of interest rates 
and inflation risks as important characteristics affecting 
the yield-maturity relationship.
In an effort to better understand the term structure 
of the loan payments for the loans in this study, duration, 
which is defined as the average time until receipt of p ay­
ment on an obligation, is a useful measure. Duration could 
provide insight into the relationship between interest rates 
and maturity since debt obligations that have similar dura­
tion but different maturities are more likely to react 
similarly to changes in interest rates than debt obliga­
tions that have similar maturity but different duration.
50
Scott F. Richard, "An Arbitrage Model of the Term 
Structure of Interest Rates," Journal of Financial Economics, 
6 (March, 1978), pp. 33-57.
Uri Dothan, ”0n the Term Structure of Interest 
R a t e s Journal of Financial Economic, 6 (March, 1978), 
pp. 59-69. . ■
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Duration measures the time and pattern over which payments
on debt obligations occur and, thus, captures more charac-
3 2teristics of the interest rate-maturity relationship.
The necessary data to accurately determine the 
functional relationship between interest rates and maturi­
ties and to determine the duration on loans was unavailable 
for use in this study. Because of the data limitations no 
research hypothesis was formulated for a predicted contin­
gent claims relationship between interest rates and maturity 
dates. Time to maturity was, however, included in the 
model as a moderating variable that has a statistically 
significant impact on the model. The resulting coefficient 
on the time to maturity cannot be predicted, only reported.
The research hypotheses were developed from combi­
ning the previous empirical studies on commercial bank loan 
analysis and contingent claims theory. The resulting func­
tional form of the regression model that is used to test 
the hypotheses is consistent with models used in previous 
studies. The form of the variables used in the regression 
analysis is consistent with previous empirical studies and
32
William P. Sharpe, Investments, (Englewood Cliffs; 
Prentice-Hall, 1978), pp. 39-40. Also see F. R. Macauley, 
Some Theoretical Problems Suggested By the Movements of 
Interest Rates, Bond Yields, and Stock Prices in the U.S. 
Since 1865 (New York, 1938) for a discussion of duration.
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were put in a frauicv/crk consistent with contingent claims 
analysis.
CHAPTER IV
EMPIRICAL TESTS AND RESULTS
The purpose of this chapter is to report the results 
of the regression analysis used to test the research hypo­
theses. After a description of the data and regression 
equation, the implications of the regression coefficients 
and statistical tests of the coefficients are reported and 
related to previous empirical studies.
Description of the Data
The Federal Reserve System and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation conduct the Survey of Terms of Bank
Lending during the first full business week of the middle
month each quarter. Participants in the survey include
approximately 340 Federal Reserve member and nonmember banks
that are randomly selected to represent insured commercial
banks in all size categories of United States banks. The
survey collects information on both price and nonprice
terms of lending on commercial, industrial, and construction
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loans. Specific infornation collected in the survey, 
shown in Appendix I, includes effective interest rates, 
loan sizes, maturity dates, floating or fixed rates,
commitment status and fees, insurance status, and collateral
„ 1 
requirements.
Description of Results 
The regression analysis in this study was conducted 
on 21,667 commercial and industrial loans collected during 
August, 1979, in the Survey of Terms of Bank Lending. With 
21,660 degrees of freedom, the specific form of the regres­
sion equation is
I = a -r B]_LogSz + Mat t B 3 Dem + B4 Com + B5 Fl + Bg Col 
The variables are described in Table I and the results in 
Table II.
See Paul W. Boltz, "Survey of Terms of Bank Lending; 
New Series," Federal Reserve Bulletin 63 (May, 1977), 442-45 
for a description of the survey.
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TABLE 1
Variables, Symbols, and Description of Variables 
Used in Regression Analysis
Variable Symbol Description
Interest rate I Effective rate of interest on loan
Logarithm of loan size Log Sz Logarithm (Base 10) of face amount 
of loan
Maturity
Collateral
Mat
Col
Number of months until final 
payment due
Col = 1 if collateral used 
Col = 0 if collateral not used
Floating interest rate Fl Fl = 1 if floating rate 
Fl = 0 if fixed rate
Commitment status Com Com = 1 if commitment loan 
Com = 0 if not commitment loan •
Demand Status Dem Dem = 1 if demand loan 
Dem = 0 if not demand loan
The effective rate of interest, the dependent var­
iable, is adjusted for discount and add-on interest calcula­
tions and is consistent in functional form with the empirical 
studies by Jacobs and Hester. Loan size was scaled by taking 
the logarithm of the original amount, which is consistent 
with Jacobs' study. The maturity is the number of 
months until final payment is due.
Collateral, floating interest rate, commitment 
status, and demand status are each used as dummy variables
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“Ehat assumed a . cftn d  ITS tire  3rosî
agreement or zero if not incorporated in the loan agree­
ment .
TABLE 2
Results of Regression Analysis Using Interest 
Rate as the Deoendent Variable
Coefficient B ^B
t-statistic
Log Sz -.2057 .0140 14.914
Mat -.008 .001 8.114
Col -.1614 .0207 7.814
Fl .7185 .0225 31.914
Com -.0378 .0224 1.69
Dem -.9829 .0218 36.161
Constant = 13.880 
r 2 = .08873
Standard Error = 1.433
Although not an issue of central importance in this 
study, the explained variance (R^) is .08873 (or 8.073% of 
the variation in interest rates can be explained by the 
model). The regression equation constant is 13.88, which
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represents the average interest rate charged to customers 
during the survey period. The standard error of the estimate, 
which indicates the amount of dispersion around the regres­
sion line, is 1.433.
The correlation matrix, shown in Table III, shows 
the degree of multicollinearity between the dependent var­
iables. The effect of multicollinearity is to obscure the 
reduction in total variation in the dependent variable which 
can be ascribed to an independent variable. The tests of 
significance in the regression coefficients may lead to the 
incorrect conclusion that the coefficients are not signifi­
cantly different from zero.
As can be seen from Table III, multicollinearity is 
not a significant problem since the correlation between most 
independent variable pairs is very low. The largest cor­
relation between independent variables occurs between floating 
rate and commitment status, log loan size, and demand status 
variables, but the correlation is not high enough to cause 
a problem.
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TABLE 3
Correlation Matrix for Regression Using 
Interest Rate as the Dependent Variable
Commitment
Status
Log Loan 
Size
Demand
Status
Collateral Floating 
Rate ■
Commitment
Status 1.0
Log Loan 
Size
.26679
1.0
Demand
Loan
.11867 .09294 1.0
Collateral . 2 0 4 8 4 -.03484 .13037 1.0
Floating
Rate
.331167 -.29385 .26861 .13947 1. 0
Time To 
Maturity
.04173 .09294 -.20398 .16251 .01286
Logarithm of Loan Size 
The coefficient for the logarithm of loan size is -.2057, 
which indicates that a one unit increase/decrease in the logarithm 
of the size of a loan, or an increase/decrease by the power of 
10, can be expected to decrease/increase the interest rate 
charged on the loan by 0.2057 of a percent. With a standard 
error .0140, the t-statistic is 14.914,causing the coefficient to 
be statistically different from zero at the 99 percent level.
The research hypothesis is accepted in support of the contingent 
claims approach. Large loans can be expected to have lower 
interest rates than smaller loans, ceteris parabis.
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In Jacob's study a statistically significant inverse 
relationship between interest rates and the logarithm of loan 
size was attributed to economies of scale in lending. Since 
substantial fixed costs are associated with lending, the cost 
per dollar decreases as the loan size increases. Boltz and 
Campbell, although not applying statistical analysis, reported 
an inverse relationship between interest rates and loan size 
with loans in the largest categories receiving prime or below 
prime rates. Boltz and Campbell attributed the relationship to 
increased credit worthiness and smaller cost per dollar 
loaned as the loan size increases.'
In the committee report on financing small business, large
firms were reported to receive lower interest rates than small
firms. If larger firms can be assumed to receive larger loans
than small firms, an inverse relationship between interest
rates and the size of loans is implied. The higher cost per dol-
2
lar loaned accounted for the higher interest rates on small loans.
Loan Risk
The coefficient for the collateral variable is -0.1614, 
which indicates that collateralized loans can be expected to 
have an interest rate .1614 of a percent lower than uncollat­
eralized loan. With a standard error of .0207 the t-statistic 
is 7.814, causing the coefficient to be statistically different 
from zero at the 99 percent level. The research hypothesis is
2
Neil B. Murphy is currently conducting a Small Business 
Administration study to disentangle the loan size and risk ef­
fects on interest rates.
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accepted in that the interest rate charged on a loan is d e ­
pendent upon collateral being used to reduce the credit risk.
The results coincide with both contingent claims theory 
and the implications of the empirical research by Hester. 
Uncollafceralized loans expose the lending institution to 
more credit risk and to compensate for the increased risk a 
higher interest rate is charged on loans that are uncolla­
teralized.
The theoretical work by Merton and by Galai and Masulis 
predicted that the more risky the underlying asset, the more 
valuable the option. The more risky the asset against which 
the option is written, the higher the interest rate charged 
on a loan. Uncollateralized loans are more risky since the 
lending institution has no physical asset to improve the re­
payment probability. The value of the option to repay the 
loan and the interest rate increase correspondingly.
Floating Interest Rates
The coefficient for the floating versus predetermined 
interest rate variable is 0.7185, which indicates that loans ■ 
which have floating rates can be expected to be .7185 of a 
percent higher than fixed rate loans. With a standard error 
of .0225 the t-statistic is 31.914, causing the coefficient to 
be statistically different from zero at the 99 percent level.
The research hypothesis is accepted in support of the contingent 
claims approach. The option to repay a loan becomes more valu­
able if the interest rate charged on the loan is allowed to
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float and leads to a correspondingly higher interest rate 
charged on the loan.
The discussion by Boltz and Campbell illustrated how 
a positively or negatively shaped yield curve may explain the 
premiums that are paid for fixed or floating rate loans.
During the survey period the yield curve was relatively flat 
and provides no insight into the results of this study.
The results of this study are consistent with the 
theoretical predictions of Merton's variable interest rate 
option valuation model. Merton's model predicts higher option 
values, and thus higher interest rates, when the interest 
rate is allowed to vary over the life of the option.
Demand Status 
The coefficient for demand status is -0.9829, which 
indicates that interest rates can be expected to be 0.9829 
of a percent lower if the loan is a demand note. With a 
standard error of .0219 the t-statistic is 36.161, causing 
the coefficient to be statistically different from zero at 
the 99 percent level. The research hypothesis is accepted in 
support of the contingent claims approach. Loans that are 
demand notes can be expected to have lower interest rates 
since the lending institution's put option reduces loan risk.
The empirical study in 1972 by Hester, which showed 
that demand notes had higher interest rates, is not consistent 
with the results of this study. Viewing the demand status as
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a put option sold by the borrower to the lending institution 
provides a broader perspective between the nature of the put 
option mechanism and the lending institution's flexibility and 
risk. The analysis of demand status as being a combination 
of puts and calls is supported by this study.
Commitment Status
The coefficient for commitment status is -0.0378, which 
indicates that interest rates can be expected to be 0.0378 of 
a percent lower if obtained under commitments than if not 
obtained under commitments. With a standard error of 0.0224 
the t-statistic is 1.69, causing the coefficient to be statisti­
cally different from zero at the 90 percent level. The re­
search hypothesis must, however, be rejected. With a sample 
size of 21,669, an hypothesis that could be only marginally 
acceptable should be rejected with explanations for the re­
jection.
Rejection of the hypothesis is consistent with previous 
empirical studies by Hester and by Boltz and Campbell. Hester 
found that loans made under commitment agreements had lower 
interest rates. Boltz and Campbell reported that commitments 
were not used for loans with interest rates below the prime 
rate, were used for loans with interest rates at or above the 
prime interest rate, and were not used on loans with interest 
rates high above the prime rate. Loan commitments were not 
used at rates high above the prime rate because banks did not
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want to be committed to lending to high risk customers and 
because borrowers in the high risk categories cannot afford 
the commitment fees, which is consistent with Jacob's con­
clusion that the lending and loan size decisions are independent 
of the interest rate.
Time To Maturity
The coefficient for time to maturity is -0.008, which
indicates that interest rates can be expected to be 0.008 of
a percent smaller as the months until maturity increases by
one month. Loans with shorter maturities can be expected to
have higher interest rates and loans with longer maturities
can be expected to have lower interest r a t e s , ceteris parabis.
With a standard error of .001 the t-statistic is 8.114, causing 
the coefficient to be statistically different from zero at
the 99 percent level.
The time to maturity was not used as in a research 
hypothesis, but as a moderating variable that would improve 
the regression results. Since no previous empirical studies 
have used time to maturity„as an independent variable to ex­
plain interest rates, the consistency of results in this study 
with past results cannot provide insight to the reasons for 
the inverse relationship.
A  possible explanation for the results may have been 
the shape of the yield curve. If the yield curve were nega­
tively sloped, lending institutions may have extended loans 
with lower interest rates for longer maturities. Extending
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low interest on long term loans is a reasonable strategy if 
future interest rates are expected to decrease, especially 
if the lending institution can charge a rate higher than the 
eventual rate occurring in the future.
At the time of the survey, August, 1979, from which 
data was used for this study, maturity spreds were historically 
narrow. The credit cycle was at a point where there was 
little compensation to borrowers for length of maturity. A 
flat yield curve does not provide adequate explanation for 
the inverse relationship between the interest rate and the 
maturity date.
Another rational for the inverse interest rate-maturity 
relationship may be attributed to the fixed costs of lending. 
The fixed costs of lending, which are relatively high compared 
to the variable costs of lending, may be spread over a longer 
time period on long term loans than on short term loans. The 
longer time period enables the bank to spread the costs over 
more payment and charge lower interest rates on the long term 
loans. On short term loans the fixed costs must be recovered 
over fewer payments resulting in higher interest rates.
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS
Analyzing commercial loans in a contingent claims 
framework requires a precise specification of how loan char­
acteristics can be considered combinations of puts and calls 
and apply to contingent claims theory. If commercial loans 
may be analyzed as contingent claims, then variables ana­
lyzed in a contingent claims framework must affect interest 
rates analogous to the way the same variables affect inter­
est rates in previous studies. The variable relating con­
tingent claims theory and traditional analysis of loans is 
the interest rate charged on a loan. Since interest rates 
and loan characteristics are observable and since an in­
terest rate equation has been developed in contingent claims 
theory, the interest rate is used as a focal point to de­
velop the research hypotheses.
Analysis of the specific variables used in the study 
generally supported the contingent claims approach to 
analyzing commercial bank loans. Empirical analysis of the 
relationship between interest rates and the logarithm of
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loan size has produced results that are consistent with the 
results in this study. The inverse relationship found in 
all studies has been attributed to economies of scale in 
lending. The fixed costs of lending may be spread over 
more dollars on large loans than on small loans and,
thus, large loans can be charged lower interest rates than 
small loans.
Variables decreasing loan risk decrease option value 
and interest rates in contingent claims framework. This 
relationship is consistent with the risk-return framework 
where interest rates also decrease with decreasing risk.
Loan collateral acts to decrease loan risk by shifting credit 
risk from the lending institution to the borrower. Any 
variable acting to reduce loan risk, such as the length 
of relationship between the lending institution and the bor­
rower, should also decrease loan risk and interest rates. 
Intangible assets can also act as collateral to reduce 
credit risk by making loan repayment self-enforcing. The 
potential loss of goodwill and/or credit rating can have 
the same effect as physical collateral. The loss of either 
of these factors may significantly impair the viability of 
the borrower.
Lending institutions extending demand loans have 
a put option since the obligation can be put onto the bor­
rower at any time during the life of the loan. In a risk- 
return framework, the lending institution is exposed to
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less risk with demand loans and should subsequently charge 
a lower interest rate. The results coincide with the risk- 
return analysis by indicating an inverse relationship b e ­
tween interest rates and demand loans. The put option held 
by the lending institution reduces risk and the required 
compensation for risk exposure.
The rejection of commitment status as being statis­
tically significant may be a result of commitment fees and/ 
or compensating balances that were paid by the borrower, 
but not included in the data analysis. Commitment loans 
that require fees or compensating balances increase the ef­
fective interest rate and would cause a stronger empirical 
relationship between commitment status and the required 
rate.
The weak empirical relationship may be a result of 
commitment fees and compensating balances that lending in­
stitutions require on commitment loans. Instead of direct­
ly increasing the interest rate to commitment borrowers, 
some lending institutions may increase the effective inter­
est rate through the commitment fees and compensating bal­
ances. An effective interest rate including commitment fees 
and compensating balances may cause a stronger empirical 
relationship and be consistent with previous empirical 
studies.
Rejection of the hypothesis cannot be used as an 
argument to invalidate the analysis of commitment loans as
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put options by Bartter and Rendleman since data on other 
types of compensation to the lending institution by bor­
rowers was not available.
Due to the complex factors affecting the interest 
rate-maturity relationship, the empirical results could not 
be hypothesized, but interest rate was used as an indepen­
dent moderating variable.
Based on the results of this study, a general con­
clusion is that commercial loans can be analyzed in a con­
tingent claims context. The value of a commercial loan is 
dependent on the loan characteristics, which refer to the 
aspects of the borrower, the lending institution, and the 
negotiated loan covenants.
While contingent claims theory is a viable method 
for commercial loan analysis, developing a complete model 
encompassing all factors affecting an interest rate would 
be difficult since intangible as well as tangible factors 
would have to be measured. Some relevant factors may be 
difficult to measure, such as friendship between the b or­
rower and lending institution and third party influence on 
the decision.
A  model including measurable loan characteristics 
would require complex interaction of put and call options 
and would include variables not used in this study. Vari­
ables that may increase the explanatory power of a contin­
gent claims model are fees, compensating balances, length
78
of banking relationship between the borrower and lending 
institution, and the prime rate.
Future research on the applicability of contingent 
claims theory to lending decisions can focus on expanding 
the explanatory power of the model by including additional 
variables such as were suggested above. Increasing the ex­
planatory power of the model makes the contingent claims 
approach a more viable alternative or complementary analyti­
cal method for loan analysis.
This study was completed during only one time seg­
ment. The results or the relationships between the interest 
rate and independent variables may change over time. An 
interesting continuation of this study in both the contin­
gent claims field and the bank lending field would be to 
conduct the regression analysis over the business cycle. In 
commerical bank lending, many empirical studies have tested 
the relationship bewteen banks and borrowers, but have been 
static in nature since only one time segment has been ob­
served. Completing this study over the business cycle 
may provide insight into the relationship between interest 
rates and the other variables in this study in diverse m ar­
ket conditions. The results may be found to be an anomoly 
of the market conditions, stable over the entire cycle, or 
change with changing market conditions, and may be used to 
infer discriminatory lending patterns toward types of bor­
rowers. The most obvious discriminatory possibility is
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whether the difference in interest rates between small loans 
and large loans is constant or changes over the business 
cycle.
Completing the study over the entire business cycle 
can also provide insight into whether contingent claims 
analysis is valid in diverse market conditions or whether 
the results of this study were an anomoly. Since no contin­
gent claims analysis of commercial loans has been done prior 
to this study, the results of a study of the relationship 
between interest rates and other variables over the entire 
bysiness cycle can provide evidence into whether the results 
of this study are stable or change with market conditions. 
Information on the relationships over time can be used to 
confirm the contingent claims approach to commerical bank 
analysis and can be used as a base for further developing 
the approach.
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